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Home | Courses | Mechanism Design and Market Institutions
Course

Mechanism Design and Market Institutions


  • Teacher(s)
    Sander Onderstal
  • Research field
    Behavioral Economics, Organizations and Markets
  • Dates
    Period 4 - Feb 28, 2022 to Apr 22, 2022
  • Course type
    Field
  • Program year
    Second
  • Credits
    3

Course description

Mechanism design concerns establishing institutional rules that maximize the designer’s objective under the constraint that the involved parties or individuals possess private information and may take private actions in their own interests.
1. Introduction, auctions
2. Revenue maximizing mechanisms, bidding rings
3. Efficient mechanisms, bilateral trade, public goods, contest design
4. Multi-unit auctions
5. Non-monetary mechanisms
6. Student presentations
7. Student presentations

Course literature

Primary reading
- Matthews, S.A. (1995). A technical primer on auction theory I: Independent private values. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University.
- Selected papers.