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Home | Events Archive | Default and Coordination in Financial Networks
Seminar

Default and Coordination in Financial Networks


  • Series
  • Speaker(s)
    Nizar Allouch (University of Kent, United Kingdom)
  • Field
    Complexity, Macroeconomics
  • Location
    UvA - E-building, Roetersstraat 11, Room E5.22
    Amsterdam
  • Date and time

    December 05, 2018
    16:00 - 17:15

This paper investigates a model of strategic interactions in financial networks, where the decision by one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape default. Agents’ payoffs are determined by the clearing mechanism introduced in the seminal contribution of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). We first show the existence of a Nash equilibrium of this default game. Next, we develop an algorithm to find all Nash equilibria that relies on the financial network structure. Finally, we explore some policy implications to achieve efficient coordination.