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Home | Events Archive | SEMINAR CANCELLED Double Overreaction in Beauty-Contests with Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment
Seminar

SEMINAR CANCELLED Double Overreaction in Beauty-Contests with Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment


  • Series
    Array
  • Speaker(s)
    Camille Cornand (University of Lyon, France)
  • Field
    Complexity
  • Location
    University of Amsterdam - E-building, Roetersstraat 11
    Amsterdam
  • Date and time

    April 17, 2020
    16:00 - 17:15

Central banks' disclosures, such as forward guidance, have a weaker effect on the economy in reality than in theoretical models. The present paper contributes to understanding how people pay attention and react to various sources of information. In a beauty-contest with information acquisition, we show that strategic complementarities give rise to a double overreaction to public disclosures by increasing agents equilibrium attention, which, in turn, increases the weight assigned to them in equilibrium action. A laboratory experiment provides evidence that the effect of strategic complementarities on the realised attention and the realised action is qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions, though quantitatively weaker. Both the lack of attention to public disclosures and a limited level of reasoning by economic agents account forthe weaker realised reaction. This suggests that it is just as important for a central bank to control reaction to public disclosures by swaying information acquisition by recipients as it is by shaping information disclosures themselves. Joint with Romain Baeriswyl and Kene Boun My.