

Workshop on Mechanism Design

Friday 12 June 2026

10:00-18:00

Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, E building, room E5.22

Organizers: Daniel Barreto, José Luis Moraga-González, Sander Onderstal, Maarten Pieter Schinkel

Program

10:00–10:30	Tea & coffee
10:30–11:10	Helene Mass (U Vienna) Gaming the Test - When Should Test Thresholds be Unpredictable?
11:10–11:50	Eduardo Perez-Richet (Sciences Po) Non-Market Screening with Investment
11:50–12:30	Changhwa Lee (U Bristol) Optimal Recommendation Mechanism
12:30–13:30	Lunch
13:30–14:10	Martin Hagen (CUNEF U) Optimal Refugee Status Determination
14:10–14:50	Roland Strausz (Humboldt U Berlin) Mediated Renegotiation
14:50–15:30	Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics) Dynamic Market Design in Large Economies. Foundations and Applications to the Design of Dynamic Incentives
15:30–16:00	Coffee & tea
16:00–16:40	Daniel Barreto (U Amsterdam) Redistribution through Market Segmentation
16:40–17:20	Jacopo Bizzotto (Oslo Metropolitan U) Design and Sale of Market Segments
17:20	Drinks
18:00	Dinner (upon invitation)