Cai, X., Gautier, P. and Wolthoff, R. (2023). MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS International Economic Review, 64(1):155--185.
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Affiliated author
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Publication year2023
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JournalInternational Economic Review
This article shows how meeting frictions affect equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations in an environment where identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex ante heterogeneous private valuations. Multiple submarkets can emerge, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and the buyers who visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high-valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket, and low valuation buyers can be in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket, and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry fees.