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Research Master Pre-Defense

Leader Legitimacy in Social Dilemmas: How Do Different Ways of Appointing Leaders Shape Cooperation in Public Good Games?

  • Date and time

    July 02, 2025
    09:00 - 17:00

Economists have studied several avenues to improve cooperation in the frequent situations where individually rational strategies yield socially inefficient outcomes. In public good games, the introduction of a first-mover generally improves contributions, although results are not always consistent. Under the empirically motivated assumption that most agents reciprocate contributions by other players only in part, we hypothesize that a leader's perceived legitimacy matters to stimulate larger contributions. We therefore conduct an experiment where the first-mover in a one-shot sequential public good game is appointed at random or based on two legitimizing features: we select benevolent leaders based on donations to charity in a variation of the dictator game and competent leaders based on performance in a series of control questions about the public good set-up. By also studying how these experimental manipulations affect attitudes towards cooperation, first- and second-order beliefs, as well as legitimacy perceptions, we shed light on the relevance of perceived legitimacy when designing institutions intended to curb social dilemmas.