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Home | News | PhD Defense Zara Sharif
News | May 27, 2016

PhD Defense Zara Sharif

On Thursday June 2, 2016 Zara Sharif defended her PhD thesis entitled ‘Essays on Strategic Communication’ at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Supervisor is fellow Otto Swank (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and copromotor fellow Vladimir Karamychev (Erasmus University Rotterdam). Other committee members are fellow Bauke Visser (Erasmus University Rotterdam), fellow Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam), Christophe Bravard (University of Grenoble), Wilko Letterie (Maastricht University) and fellow Kirsten Rohde (Erasmus University Rotterdam). The PhD defense took place in the Senate Hall of Erasmus University Rotterdam.

About

Zara Sharif (1985) obtained a BSc (Hons) in Economics, with minor in Mathematics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences in Pakistan and an MPhil degree in Economics (2011) at Tinbergen Institute and University of Amsterdam. In 2011, she joined TI’s Organizations and Markets research group at Erasmus University Rotterdam as a PhD candidate.

Abstract: ‘Essays on Strategic Communication”

Economic agents, such as consumers, firm managers, or governments, often rely on others for information. It is well understood that agents in a position to inform others on decision relevant matters can, and often do, manipulate information for personal gain. In this dissertation we explore the incentives of agents to truthfully communicate their information to decision-makers. We are primarily interested in two concerns. The first is the amount of information that can be credibly transmitted in equilibrium, and the second is the extent to which an agent is able to bias the outcome towards its own interest. We explore these two concerns in various settings.