9th Tinbergen Institute Conference: 70Years Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

Introduction

The conference aims to provide an overview of the advances that Game Theory has brought to the field of economics and to bring out new challenges for the future. For this, leading researchers in Game Theory will give lectures on different topics in both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory and their applications to the field of economics covering a variety of areas in Economics as experimental economics, behavioural economics, information economics, industrial organization, political economy, evolutionary growth and public and welfare economics.

Background

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published in 1944 their book “Theory of games and economic behavior”. In 2014 we celebrate the 70th anniversary of this seminal work, which has changed forever the way in which economics is analysed and understood.

During these 70 years, the relevance of Game Theory for the development of Economic Theory has been clearly shown. As recognition of the achievements that Game Theory has brought to Economics, eight game theorists have received the Nobel Prize in Economics. In 1994, John F. Nash, Reinhard Selten and John C. Harsanyi became Economics Nobel for their pioneering analysisof equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games. In 2005, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling achieved the Nobel Prize in Economics for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis. In 2007, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson received the Nobel Prize in Economics for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory. Many other Nobel-prize winners in Economics, such as George Akerlof, Finn Kydland, James Mirrlees, Edward Prescott, Michael Spence, Joseph Stiglitz and William Vickrey made contributions that fit the Game-Theoretic paradigm.

Speakers

Keynote Speakers:

Geir B. Asheim (University of Oslo, Norway) - Generations playing a Chichilnisky Game

Mamoru Kaneko, (Waseda University, Japan) - Undecidability: Prediction/Decision Making in Games

Inés Macho Stadler, (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain) - Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts

George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania, United States) - Repeated Games and Reputations

Karl Schlag (University of Vienna, Austria) - Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria

Roberto Serrano (Brown University, United States) - Slutsky Matrix Norms and the Size of Bounded Rationality

William Thomson (University of Rochester, United States) - Axiomatic and Game-theoretic Analysis of Bankruptcy and Taxation Problems: An Update

Rakesh Vohra (Northwestern Unviersity, United States) - On Market Fragmentation

Jörgen Weibull, (Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden) - Tenable blocks and Settled Equilibria

Peyton Young (University of Oxford, United Kingdom) - Learning by Trial and Error

Invited speakers:

Salvador Barberà (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain) - Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation

Francis Bloch, (Université Paris 1, France) - Expectation Formation Rules and the Core of Partition Function Games

Eric van Damme (Tilburg University) - Law Enforcement under Imperfect Corporate Governance

Arantza Estévez-Fernández (Tinbergen Institute and VU Amsterdam) - New Characterizations of Largeness of the Core

Jean-Jacques Herings (Maastricht University) - Stability of networks under limited farsightedness

Maria Montero (The University of Nottingham, United Kingdom) - Bargaining in Weighted Majority Games

Hans Peters (Maastricht University) - Indirect Control and Power in Mutual Control Structures

Arno Riedl (Maastricht University) - Fairness and Coordination: the Role of Fairness Principles in Coordination Failure and Success

Guido Schäfer (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) - Inefficiency of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions

Matthijs van Veelen (University of Amsterdam) - In and out of equilibrium: evolution in repeated games