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Home | Events Archive | Identification and Inference of Network Formation Games with Misclassified Links
Seminar

Identification and Inference of Network Formation Games with Misclassified Links

  • Series
    Seminars Econometric Institute
  • Speaker
    Luis Candelaria (University of Warwick. United Kingdom)
  • Field
    Econometrics
  • Location
    Erasmus University, Mandeville building, Room T3-14
    Rotterdam
  • Date and time

    November 28, 2019
    16:00 - 17:30

Abstract:

This paper considers a network formation model when links are measured with error. We focus on a game-theoretical model of strategic network formation with incomplete information, in which the linking decisions depend on agents’ exogenous attributes and endogenous positions in the network. In the presence of link misclassification, we derive moment conditions that characterize the identified set of the preference parameters associated with homophily and network externalities. Based on the moment equality conditions, we provide an inference method that is asymptotically valid with a single network of many agents.