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Home | Events Archive | Voting in Shareholders Meetings
Seminar

Voting in Shareholders Meetings


  • Series
    Research on Monday
  • Speaker(s)
    Laurent Bouton (Georgetown University, United States)
  • Field
    Empirical Microeconomics
  • Location
    Erasmus University Rotterda, Campus Woudestein, Van der Goot Building, M3-03
    Rotterdam
  • Date and time

    June 13, 2022
    11:30 - 12:30

Abstract: This paper studies the informational efficiency of voting mechanisms in shareholder meetings. When the management does not affect the proposal being voted on, we show that voting mechanisms are more efficient when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. When the management has agenda power, we uncover a novel trade-off: more efficient mechanisms provide worse incentives to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient mechanisms.

Please, register here, if you are interested in:

  • a bilateral meeting,
  • lunch with Laurent and some colleagues after seminar,
  • dinner (early dinner as Laurent needs to go back to BXL on Monday evening)

(Note there’s no need to register if you would just like to attend the seminar)