Fact-Checking Politicians
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Series
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Speaker(s)Francesco Sobbrio (Tor Vergata University of Rome, Italy)
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FieldBehavioral Economics, Organizations and Markets
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LocationErasmus University Rotterdam, Campus Woudestein, Langeveld 3.02
Rotterdam -
Date and time
April 13, 2026
11:30 - 12:30
Abstract
We study how politicians respond to the fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design employs a difference-in-differences approach, complemented by a randomized field intervention conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking organization. We find that fact-checking discourages politicians from making factually incorrect statements, with effects lasting several weeks. At the same time, we show that fact-checking neither increases nor displaces correct statements. Politicians who are fact-checked tend to substitute incorrect statements with either no statements or unverifiable ones, suggesting that they may also respond by increasing the “ambiguity” of their language to avoid public scrutiny. Joint paper with Andrea Mattozzi and Samuel Nocito.