Effects of Mandatory Job Postings on Labor Market Outcomes

Abstract

This paper studies how mandating job postings affects firms' recruiting practices, employment, and wages, exploiting the Swiss Job Vacancy Notice Obligation (JVNO) policy, which requires firms hiring in high-unemployment occupations to post vacancies on a public online platform. We leverage administrative data and estimate two empirical models: a regression discontinuity design that compares occupations around the unemployment rate threshold and a firm-level shift-share approach that captures differential exposure to treated occupations. We find that the policy leads to a significant increase in both job postings and posting firms in treated occupations, with effects driven primarily by smaller firms. Firm-level evidence shows these changes reflect a genuine expansion in employment rather than a simple reallocation of hiring activity and are accompanied by wage increases. We further document higher exit rates from unemployment to treated occupations with no corresponding increase in job search activity. Taken together, the results indicate that mandatory job postings can improve matching efficiency by increasing vacancy creation and improving the allocation of workers to jobs. Joint paper with Rafael Lalive and Alberto Marcato.