Socioeconomic Status and Executing a Task in the Future

Abstract

Some tasks can only be completed at a specific time in the future, for example canceling subscriptions on services one no longer needs, applying for social benefits, and voting in (national) elections. We study how this delayed nature of a task affects low- and high SES households' ability to successfully complete it. In a real-effort field experiment we promise households a reward of 20 euros in cash if they return a postcard. They either get a short time-window of 4 days in the next month (future task treatment) or can return it any time (control treatment). We also vary the timing, either in the week before or after salaries and social benefits are typically received. The results show that the penalty of having to the delay the task (as observed from the return rates) is significantly larger for the low SES households than for the high SES households. We find weak effects that this effect is stronger in the week after salaries and social benefits are typically paid out. We explore potential mechanisms that can explain our findings.