Fellow Maarten Pieter Schinkel Presented Research at European Policy Event
Fellow Maarten Pieter Schinkel presented his on-going research on sustainability and collusion at the European Competition and Consumer Day that took place in Helsinki on September 26.
The European Competition and Consumer Day this year is part of Finland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The meeting brought together 250 experts, primarily agency officials. The two topics on the agenda were the links between sustainable growth and development and competition law, and the consumer perspective on digitalization.
Schinkel gave a keynote talk to, and subsequently participated in the panel on Sustainability and EU Competition Law. The Netherlands is a forerunner in enforcement initiatives to exempt horizontal agreements with anticompetitive effects from the cartel law, if they promote sustainable production. Cases are Het Nationale Energieakkoord (2013) and De Kip van Morgen (2015). The subject is now on the European Commission’s agenda.
Schinkel is critical of the initiative and warns for green-washing cartels. He presented research results of several co-authored papers, centered around the question whether we should expect a cartel to promote sustainability:
- Schinkel & Spiegel (IJIO, 2017), Can Collusion Promote Sustainable Production?
- Martinez, Onderstal & Schinkel (2019), Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab
- Treuren & Schinkel (2018), Can Collusion Promote Sustainable Consumption and Production? Not Beneficially Beyond Duopoly
- Schinkel & Toth (2017), Balancing the Public Interest-Defense in Cartel Offenses
On October 24, the College of Europe organizes a day-long conference on the subject in Brussels, at which Schinkel will also speak. The event will be opened by Commissioner Margrethe Vestager.
Schinkel is Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam. He specializes in Competition economics and regulation. His research interests are in industrial organization, competition policy and regulation theory, in particular public and private enforcement. His recent papers consider the dating of cartel effects, Libor/Euribor manipulation, public interest benefits of collusion, priority setting by government agencies and behavioral State aid conditions in Dutch mortgage banking. Find more about his research and other activities on his personal webpage.