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Otto Swank

Research Fellow
University
Erasmus University Rotterdam
E-mail
swank@ese.eur.nl
Research field
Organizations and Markets
Interests
Organizational Economics, Personnel Economics
Website
Link to personal website

Key publications

List of publications

Delfgaauw, J. and Swank, O. (2024). The political climate trap Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 124:.

Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2023). Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition Journal of Public Economics, 221:.

Karamychev, VladimirA. and Swank, OttoH. (2022). A social image theory of information acquisition, opinion formation, and voting European Journal of Political Economy, 74:.

Bijkerk, S., Dominguez Martinez, S., Kamphorst, J. and Swank, O. (2021). Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals Journal of Labor Economics, 39(2):437--460.

Sharif, Z. and Swank, O. (2019). Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy? De Economist, 167:127--143.

Bijkerk, S., Karamychev, V. and Swank, O. (2018). When Words are not Enough Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 149:294--314.

Kamphorst, J. and Swank, O. (2018). The role of performance appraisals in motivating employees Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 27(2):251--269.

Delfgaauw, J. and Swank, O. (2016). Task-specific human capital and organizational inertia Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 25(3):608--626.

Kamphorst, J. and Swank, O. (2016). Don't Demotivate, Discriminate American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1):140--165.

Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2015). Learning from others? Decision rights,strategic communication, and reputational concerns American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(4):109--149.

Kamphorst, J. and Swank, O. (2013). When Galatea cares about her reputation: How having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine European Economic Review, 60:91--104.

Visser, B., Swank, O. and Crutzen, B. (2013). Confidence Management: on Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22(4):744--767.

Visser, B. and Swank, O. (2013). Is Transparency to no Avail? Committee Decision- Making, Pre- meetings, and Credible Deals The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115:967--994.

Swank, O. (2010). Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians? Journal of Health Economics, 29(2):191--332.

Swank, O. and Dominguez Martinez, S. (2009). A Simple Model of Self-Assessment Economic Journal, 119(539):1225--1241.

Swank, J., Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2009). How committees of experts interact with the outside world: Some theory, and evidence from the FOMC Journal of the European Economic Association, 6:478--486.

Dominguez Martinez, S., Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2008). In defense of Boards Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3):667--682.

Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2008). The consequences of endogenizing information for the performance of a sequential decision procedure Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65(3):667--681.

Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2007). Do Elections Lead to Informed Public Decisions? Public Choice, 129:435--460.

Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2007). Motivating through delegating tasks of giving attention Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23:731--742.

Visser, B. and Swank, O. (2007). On committees of experts Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1):337--372.

Wrasai, P.(. and Swank, O. (2007). Policy Makers, Advisers and Reputation Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62:579--590.

Swank, O. and Dominguez Martinez, S. (2006). Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control Social Choice and Welfare, 26:527--545.

Dur, R. and Swank, O. (2005). Producing and Manipulating Information Economic Journal, 115:185--199.

Beniers, K.(. and Swank, O. (2004). On the composition of committees Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20:353--378.

Ossokina, I. and Swank, O. (2004). The optimal degree of polarization European Journal of Political Economy, 20:255--262.

Suurmond, G.(., Swank, O. and Visser, B. (2004). On the bad reputation of reputational concerns Journal of Public Economics, 88:2817--2838.

Ossokina, I. and Swank, O. (2003). Polarization, political instability and active learning The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(1):1--14.

Swank, O. (2002). Budgetary devices for spending prone ministers and bureaucrats Public Choice, 111:237--257.

Swank, O. (2001). A comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 46(4):437--440.

Swank, O. and Dur, R. (2001). Why do policy makers give (permanent) power to policy advisers? Economics and Politics, 13(1):73--93.

Swank, O. (2000). Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns European Journal of Political Economy, 16(2):257--271.

Swank, O. (2000). Why do workers spend so much time on inferior tasks Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156(3):501--512.

Swank, O. and Hillman, A. (2000). Why political culture should be in the lexicon of economics European Journal of Political Economy, 16(1):1--5.

Letterie, W., Swank, O. and van Dalen, H. (2000). When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus Social Choice and Welfare, 17(3):439--461.

Swank, O., Letterie, W. and van Dalen, H. (1999). A theory of policy advice The Journal of Law and Economics, 10:85--103.

Swank, O. and Eisinga, R. (1999). Economic outcomes and voting behaviour in a multi-party system: an application to the Netherlands Public Choice, 101:195--213.

Swank, O., Peletier, B. and Dur, R. (1999). Voting on the budget deficit: comment American Economic Review, (89):1377--1381.

Dur, R. and Swank, O. (1998). The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock European Journal of Political Economy, 14(3):561--572.

Letterie, W. and Swank, O. (1998). Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections Economics and Politics, 10(1):85--103.

Swank, O. (1998). Budgetary decisions De Economist, 145:127--129.

Swank, O. (1998). Partisan policies, macroeconomic performance an political support Journal of Macroeconomics, 20(2):367--386.

Swank, O. (1998). Towards an economic theory of ideology European Journal of Political Economy, 14:223--240.

Swank, O. and Letterie, W. (1997). Learning and signalling by advisor selection Public Choice, 92:353--367.

Swank, O. (1997). Some evidence on policy makers' motives, macroeconomic performance and output-inflation trade-offs Applied Economics, 29:251--258.

Lippi, F.(. and Swank, O. (1996). Do policymakers' distributional desires lead to an inflationary bias? Journal of Policy Modeling, 18(1):109--116.

Swank, O. (1996). Partisan politics, divided government and the economy De Economist, 144(3):510--512.

van Dalen, H. and Swank, O. (1996). Government spending cycles: ideological or opportunistic? Public Choice, 89:183--200.

Swank, O. (1995). Rational voters in a partisanship model Social Choice and Welfare, 12:13--27.

Siebrand, J. and Swank, O. (1994). Partisan profiles in presidential policies Journal of Macroeconomics, 16:553--559.

Swank, O. (1994). Better monetary control may increase the inflationary bias of policy The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 96:125--131.

Swank, O. (1994). Partisan views on the economy Public Choice, 81:137--150.

Swank, O. and Swank, J. (1993). In search of the motives behind US fiscal macroeconomic policy Applied Economics, 25:1013--1022.