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Home | People | Ines Lindner
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Ines Lindner

Research Fellow

University
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Research field
Complexity
Interests
Econometric Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Methods, Microeconomic Theory

List of publications

M. Koster and S. Kurz and I.D. Lindner and S. Napel. 2017. The prediction value. Social Choice and Welfare, 48, 433--460, 0176-1714

J. Huang and M. Koster and I.D. Lindner. 2016. Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamics. Mathematical Social Sciences, 84, 109--118, 0165-4896

I.D. Lindner and H. Strulik. 2014. From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World. Journal of Development Economics, 109, 17--29, 0304-3878

I.D. Lindner. 2012. Review of 'Voting and collective decision-making' [Review of: A. Laruelle, F. Valenciano (2008) Voting and collective decision-making]. Social Choice and Welfare, 38, 161--179, 0176-1714

I.D. Lindner. 2012. Review Essay on `Voting and Collective Decision-making' by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano (Cambridge University Press). Social Choice and Welfare, 38, 161--179, 0176-1714

I.D. Lindner and M. Koster and R. Lindelauf and G. Owen. 2008. Mass-Mobilization with Noisy Conditional Beliefs. Mathematical Social Sciences, 55, 55--77, 0165-4896

I.D. Lindner. 2008. A Special Case of Penrose's Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed. Theory and Decision, 64, 495--518, 0040-5833

I.D. Lindner and H. Strulik. 2008. Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms end Economic Development. Economica, 75, 244--258, 0013-0427

I.D. Lindner. 2008. The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters. Social Choice and Welfare, 30, 581--601, 0176-1714

I.D. Lindner. 2008. The Power of a Collectivity to Act in Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters. Social Choice and Welfare, 30, 581--601, 0176-1714

I.D. Lindner. 2008. A Generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters. Economic Theory, 35, 607--611, 0938-2259

I.D. Lindner and G. Owen. 2007. Cases where the Penrose Limit Theorem does not hold. Mathematical Social Sciences, 53, 232--238, 0165-4896

I.D. Lindner and G. Owen and S.L. Feld and B. Grofman and L. Ray. 2006. A Simple 'Market Value' Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems. International Journal of Game Theory, 35, 111--128, 0020-7276

I.D. Lindner and M. Machover. 2004. L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases. Mathematical Social Sciences, 47, 37--49, 0165-4896

I.D. Lindner and H. Strulik. 2004. Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution. Economic Theory, 23, 439--444, 0938-2259

I.D. Lindner and H. Strulik. 2004. Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights. Public Choice, 120, 143--167, 0048-5829

I.D. Lindner and M.J. Holler. 2004. Mediation as Signal. European Journal of Law and Economics, 17, 165--173, 0929-1261