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Schram, A. and Onderstal, S. (2009). Bidding to give: an experimental comparison of auctions for charity International Economic Review, 50(2):431--457.


  • Journal
    International Economic Review

We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms.