Estevez Fernandez, M.A., Borm, P. and Hamers, H. (2006). On the core of multiple longest traveling salesman games European Journal of Operational Research, 174(3):1816--1827.

In this paper we introduce multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) games. An MLTS game arises from a network in which a salesman has to visit each node (player) precisely once, except to his home location, in such an order that maximizes the total reward. First it is shown that the value of a coalition of an MLTS game is determined by taking the maximum of suitable combinations of one and two person coalitions. Secondly it is shown that MLTS games with five or less players have a nonempty core. However, a six player MLTS game may have an empty core. For the special instance in which the reward between a pair of nodes is equal to 0 or 1, we provide relations between the structure of the core and the underlying network. {\textcopyright} 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.