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van den Brink, J.R. (2010). Axiomatizations of Banzhaf Permisson Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure. International Journal of Game Theory, 39:445--466.


  • Journal
    International Journal of Game Theory

In games with a permission structure it is assumed that players in a cooperative transferable utility game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. We provide axiomatic characterizations of Banzhaf permission values being solutions that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to modified TU-games. In these characterizations we use power- and player split neutrality properties. These properties state that splitting a player's authority and/or contribution over two players does not change the sum of their payoffs. {\textcopyright} The Author(s) 2010.