• Graduate Programs
  • Research
  • Browse our Courses
  • Events
    • Events Calendar
    • Events Archive
    • Summer School
      • Applied Public Policy Evaluation
      • Deep Learning
      • Development Economics
      • Economics of Blockchain and Digital Currencies
      • Economics of Climate Change
      • The Economics of Crime
      • Foundations of Machine Learning with Applications in Python
      • From Preference to Choice: The Economic Theory of Decision-Making
      • Inequalities in Health and Healthcare
      • Marketing Research with Purpose
      • Markets with Frictions
      • Modern Toolbox for Spatial and Functional Data
      • Sustainable Finance
      • Tuition Fees and Payment
      • Business Data Science Summer School Program
    • Tinbergen Institute Lectures
    • 2026 Tinbergen Institute Opening Conference
    • Annual Tinbergen Institute Conference
  • News
  • Summer School
    • Applied Public Policy Evaluation
    • Deep Learning
    • Development Economics
    • Economics of Blockchain and Digital Currencies
    • Economics of Climate Change
    • The Economics of Crime
    • Foundations of Machine Learning with Applications in Python
    • From Preference to Choice: The Economic Theory of Decision-Making
    • Inequalities in Health and Healthcare
    • Marketing Research with Purpose
    • Markets with Frictions
    • Modern Toolbox for Spatial and Functional Data
    • Sustainable Finance
    • Tuition Fees and Payment
  • Alumni

Brandts, J., Saijo, T. and Schram, A. (2004). A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Public Goods Games Public Choice, 119(3-4):381--424.


  • Journal
    Public Choice

This paper studies behavior in experimentswith a linear voluntary contributionsmechanism for public goods conducted inJapan, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.S.A.The same experimental design was used inthe four countries. Our `contributionfunction' design allows us to obtain a viewof subjects' behavior from twocomplementary points of view. It yieldsinformation about situations where, inpurely pecuniary terms, it is a dominantstrategy to contribute all the endowmentand about situations where it is a dominantstrategy to contribute nothing. Our resultsshow, first, that differences in behavioracross countries are minor. We find thatwhen people play `the same game' theybehave similarly. Second, for all fourcountries our data are inconsistent withthe explanation that subjects contributeonly out of confusion. A common cooperativemotivation is needed to explain the data.