Zou, Z., \van den Brink\, R. and Funaki, Y. (2021). Compromising between the proportional and equal division values Journal of Mathematical Economics, 97:1--11.

We introduce a family of values for TU-games that offers a compromise between the proportional and equal division values. Each value, called an α-mollified value, is obtained in two steps. First, linear functions are defined that associate a real number to every TU-game. Second, the weight assigned by this function is used to weigh proportionality and equality principles in allocating the worth of the grand coalition. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this family, and show that this family contains the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as the only linear values. Further, we identify the proportional division value and the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as those members of this family, that satisfy projection consistency.