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Koudijs, P., de Jong, A. and Kooijmans, T. (2023). Plantation Mortgage-Backed Securities: Evidence from Surinam in the 18th Century The Journal of Economic History, 83(3).


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    The Journal of Economic History

In the second half of the 18th century, Dutch bankers channeled investors{\textquoteright} funds to sugar and coffee plantations in the Caribbean, Surinam in particular. Agency problems between plantation owners, bankers, and investors led to an arrangement called negotiaties. Bankers oversaw plantations{\textquoteright} cash-flows and placed mortgage-debt with investors. We demonstrate how this securitization arrangement worked using market-wide data and detailed records from banker F.W. Hudig. During the boom, debt contracts and their securitization were an effective solution for planters, bankers, and investors. However, the market crashed after an oversupply of credit. This led to inefficient restructuring due to debt overhang.