Bénabou, R., Henkel, L., Falk, A. and Tirole, J. (2026). Eliciting moral preferences under image concerns: Theory and experiment Games and Economic Behavior, 160:104044.

We analyze how the impact of image motives on behavior varies with two key features of the choice mechanism: single versus multiple decisions, and certainty versus uncertainty of consequences. Using direct elicitation (DE) versus multiple-price-list (MPL) or equivalently Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) schemes as exemplars, we develop a game-theoretic model to characterize how image-seeking inflates prosocial giving. The signaling bias (relative to true preferences) is shown to depend on the interaction between elicitation method and visibility level: it is greater under DE for low image concerns, and greater under MPL/BDM for high ones. We experimentally test the model{\textquoteright}s predictions and find the predicted crossing effect.