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Jochem, T., Ormazabal, G. and Rajamani, A. (2025). Why have CEO pay levels become less diverse? The Journal of Finance.

  • Journal
    The Journal of Finance

This paper documents a new stylized fact: the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously in recent years. We offer one explanation for this decline, namely, firms are increasingly benchmarking CEO compensation to industry peers closest in size, thereby creating pay clusters. Our empirical tests provide support for this explanation and suggest that the rise of industry-size benchmarking is driven by three institutional factors: the mandatory disclosure of compensation peer groups, proxy advisory influence, and say-on-pay regulation. Our findings highlight a consequence of adopting a one-size-fits-all standard in the pay-setting process.