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Home | Events Archive | The Greater Game in School Choice: Manipulating School Priorities through Address Changes
Seminar

The Greater Game in School Choice: Manipulating School Priorities through Address Changes


  • Series
  • Speaker(s)
    Hans Sievertsen (Bristol University, United Kingdom)
  • Field
    Empirical Microeconomics
  • Location
    Online
  • Date and time

    September 21, 2021
    16:00 - 17:00

Please send an email to Nadine Ketel or Paul Muller if you are interested to participate in this seminar (series).

Abstract
We study the efficiency and equity implications of address manipulation in school choice. Combining Danish survey data and administrative records we provide evidence of strategic address changes among high school applicants. We exploit policies variation and study mobility patterns to verify that these moves are likely to be driven by incentives to increase chances for admission to preferred high schools, and unlikely to be driven by other motives. Finally, we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, how this behavior affects efficiency and increases inequality in school choice mechanisms. Joint paper with Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, Lykke Sterll Christensen and Mikkel Høst Gandil.