Private Equity and Workers: Modeling and Measuring Monopsony, Reallocation, and Trust

We measure the real effects of private equity buyouts on worker outcomes by building a new database that links transactions to matched employer-employee data in the United States. To guide our empirical analysis, we derive testable implications from three theories in which private equity managers alter worker outcomes: (1) exertion of monopsony power, (2) breach of trust of implicit contracts with workers, and (3) efficient reallocation of workers across plants. We do not find any evidence that private equity-backed firms vary wages and employment based on local labor market power proxies. Moreover, layoffs and wage losses are very similar across occupation and employee characteristics, suggesting a rejection of the breach of trust hypothesis. We find strong evidence that private equity managers downsize less productive plants relative to productive plants while simultaneously reallocating high-wage workers to more productive plants. We conclude that post-buyout employment and wage dynamics are consistent with professional investors providing incentives to increase productivity and monitor the companies in which they invest.

Joint work: Josh Lerner, Gordon M. Phillips, Francisca Rebelo, and Benjamin Sampson