Values for Global Cooperative Games
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SeriesTI Complexity in Economics Seminars
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Speaker(s)Mikel Alvarez-Mozos (University of Barcelona, Spain)
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FieldComplexity
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LocationTinbergen Institute, room 1.24 (Shanghai)
Amsterdam -
Date and time
November 18, 2025
16:00 - 17:15
Abstract
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We investigate the implications of weakening the symmetry property of their characterization and obtain the class of all linear, efficient, and anonymous values that also satisfy the null player property. Finally, we present and characterize the Lattice Structure Value, which is an alternative extension of the Shapley value to this setting. Joint paper with J.M. Alonso-Meijide, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, and A. Jimenez-Losada.