Co-producing compliance: Evidence from a waste-sorting experiment in Lebanon

Abstract

Securing citizen compliance is a foundational challenge of governance, particularly where enforcement is costly and state capacity is limited. Co-production—arrangements pairing government with civil society and citizens to deliver public goods—holds promise as an alternative, but evidence from low-capacity settings remains thin. We evaluate a cluster-randomized field experiment in Lebanon, where a social enterprise and municipal government co-designed a waste-sorting program. Inspectors evaluated household sorting quality and a mobile app delivered personalized feedback. Sorting quality improved by 0.24 stars out of 5 on average and by 2.4 stars among compliers. Knowledge drove initial gains, as treated households improved their understanding of sorting rules. Sustained monitoring proved necessary for durability, however, with effects attenuating once the program ended. Compliance gains also crowded out civic behaviors like volunteering, pointing to moral licensing rather than civic identity activation. Co-production can therefore unlock compliance in the absence of enforcement, but when the state recedes, so do citizens.