Paper by Maarten Lindeboom and Pierre Koning has been published in the Journal of Human Resources
Abstract
We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch disability insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “gatekeeper protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40 percent in one year) following the reform, particularly among those with difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals who were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by self-screening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.
Article citation
Mathilde Godard, Pierre Koning and Maarten Lindeboom. September 2024. "Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance" Journal of Human Resources, Vol.