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Home | News | Publication Pieter Gautier in American Economic Review
News | June 10, 2014

Publication Pieter Gautier in American Economic Review

The article ‘Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions’ by Pieter Gautier was published in the October 2014 issue of the American Economic Review (AER).

With James Albrecht and Susan Vroman (both Georgetown University, United States), Gautier demonstrates in this paper the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which the authors allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information. The full text article (October 2014) can be downloaded here.

 Article Citation: Albrecht, James, Pieter A. Gautier, and Susan Vroman. 2014. “Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions.” American Economic Review, 104(10): 3288-96. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.10.3288