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van der Weele, J., Kulisa, J., Kosfeld, M. and Friebel, G. (2014). Resisting moral wiggle room: How robust is reciprocal behavior? American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(3):256--264.


  • Journal
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.