Englmaier, F., Llorente, L., Onderstal, S. and Sausgruber, R. (2009). The chopstick auction: a study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2):286--291.

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the 'chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is less efficient than the second-price sealed-bid auction and that it yields more [the same] revenue if bidders are inexperienced [experienced]. Keywords: Chopstick auction; Exposure problem; Laboratory experiment; Second-price sealed-bid auction JEL classification codes: C9; D44