Karamychev, V. and Visser, B. (2016). Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning International Journal of Game Theory, 46(3):813--850.

We study Sender-optimal signaling equilibria with cheap talk and money-burning. Under general assumptions, the Sender never uses money-burning to reveal all states, but always wants to garble information for at least some states. With quadratic preferences and any log-concave density of the states, optimal communication is garbled for all states: money-burning, if used at all, is used to adjust pooling intervals. This is illustrated by studying in depth the well-known uniform-quadratic case. We also show how the presence of a cost of being “caught unprepared” that gives rise to a small change in a common assumption on the Receiver{\textquoteright}s utility function makes full revelation through money-burning Sender-optimal.