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Sonnemans, J. (2024). Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics.


  • Journal
    Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? This question may seem impossible to answer, because one cannot compare the beliefs of participants who did or did not report their beliefs: we cannot know beliefs that we don't measure. In an experiment, participants first answer trivia questions, and are then asked to estimate how many questions they have answered right. In the two treatments the payoff function is skewed: either over or underestimations are punished more severe. This manipulation causes a difference in report between the two treatments and the main question is whether that changes actual beliefs. In the third part participants rate per question how likely their answer is right, and in the final part participants choose between payment per correctly answered question or a tournament. The ratings per question differ only marginally between the treatments, and no effect was found on behavior.