• Graduate Programs
  • Research
  • Browse our Courses
  • Events
    • Events Calendar
    • Events Archive
    • Summer School
      • Applied Public Policy Evaluation
      • Deep Learning
      • Development Economics
      • Economics of Blockchain and Digital Currencies
      • Economics of Climate Change
      • The Economics of Crime
      • Foundations of Machine Learning with Applications in Python
      • From Preference to Choice: The Economic Theory of Decision-Making
      • Inequalities in Health and Healthcare
      • Marketing Research with Purpose
      • Markets with Frictions
      • Modern Toolbox for Spatial and Functional Data
      • Sustainable Finance
      • Tuition Fees and Payment
      • Business Data Science Summer School Program
    • Tinbergen Institute Lectures
    • 2026 Tinbergen Institute Opening Conference
    • Annual Tinbergen Institute Conference
  • News
  • Summer School
    • Applied Public Policy Evaluation
    • Deep Learning
    • Development Economics
    • Economics of Blockchain and Digital Currencies
    • Economics of Climate Change
    • The Economics of Crime
    • Foundations of Machine Learning with Applications in Python
    • From Preference to Choice: The Economic Theory of Decision-Making
    • Inequalities in Health and Healthcare
    • Marketing Research with Purpose
    • Markets with Frictions
    • Modern Toolbox for Spatial and Functional Data
    • Sustainable Finance
    • Tuition Fees and Payment
  • Alumni

Weitzel, U. and Kling, G. (2018). Sold Below Value? Why Takeover Offers Can Have Negative Premiums Financial Management, 47(2):421--450.


  • Journal
    Financial Management

Many studies have acknowledged the existence of negative offer premiums where the initial bid undercuts the target's preannouncement market price. However, this phenomenon has not been explained. Negative premiums occur frequently and are no measurement error. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically that “hidden earnouts,” where target shareholders participate in the bidder's share of joint synergies, and corrections of overvaluation explain negative premiums. We find that target shareholders profit from the consummation of a takeover even if the announced offer has a negative premium. Our theory generalizes to low positive premiums with predictive power for the bottom 25% of all premiums.