Shrouded Attributes of Workplace Incentive Contracts: The Case of the Ratchet Effect
Johannes Abeler (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
- CREED Seminars
Johannes Abeler (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
Coen Teulings (University of Utrecht)
Gonzague Vannoorenberghe (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium)
Sara Rellstab (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Jonathan Klick (University of Pennsylvania, United States and Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Pierre Picard (Université du Luxembourg)
Coen van de Kraats (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Eleanor M. Fox (New York University, United States)
Cisil Sarisoy Linke (Federal Reserve Bank, United States)
Winnie van Dijk (University of Chicago, United States)
Christine Desan (Harvard Law School, United States)
Janet Currie (Princeton University, United States)
Michaela Carlana (Harvard University, United States)
David Maddison (University of Birmingham, United Kingdom)
Michael Kopel (University of Graz, Austria)
Sebastien Fontenay (Université Libre Bruxelles, Belgium)
Sandy Tubeuf (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium)
Hans van Kippersluis (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Alon Brav (Duke University, United States)
Jan-Emmanuel de Neve (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)