Shrouded Attributes of Workplace Incentive Contracts: The Case of the Ratchet Effect
Johannes Abeler (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
- CREED Seminars
Johannes Abeler (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
Coen Teulings (University of Utrecht)
Jonathan Klick (University of Pennsylvania, United States and Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Pierre Picard (Université du Luxembourg)
Jaap Abbring (Tilburg University), Alessandro Gavazza (London School of Economics, United Kingdom) Andrew Rhodes (Toulouse School of Economics, France), and Bertel Schjerning (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
Jurre Thiel (Vrije Universiteit)
Eleanor M. Fox (New York University, United States)
Jordi Blanes i Vidal (London School of Economics), Greg Taylor (University of Oxford), Jeannette Brosig-Koch (University of Duisburg-Essen), Céline Bonnet (Toulouse School of Economics), Jana Friedrichsen (German Institute for Economic Research DIW Berlin), Theo Offerman (University of Amsterdam), Ayse Mermer (University of Amsterdam), Harold Houba (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Winnie van Dijk (University of Chicago, United States)
Christine Desan (Harvard Law School, United States)
Liying Zhang
David Maddison (University of Birmingham, United Kingdom)
Michael Kopel (University of Graz, Austria)
Anghel Negriu (University of Amsterdam)
Andries van Vlodrop (Vrije Universiteit)
Hans van Kippersluis (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
John Gibson (University of Waikato, New Zealand)
Sourav Bhattacharya (Indian Institute of Management Calcutta)
Stefano Caria (University of Bristol)
Junze Sun (University of Amsterdam)